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We provide a model of television advertising based on an explicit characterization of an 
advertisement￿s contribution to an advertiser￿s profits that suggests that each program faces a 
downward sloping demand for its ad time.  Hence Fournier and Martin￿s (1983) ￿law of one 
price￿ does not hold in our model. We study these contrasting arguments about television 
advertising by examining the pricing of broadcast network advertising. In conducting this 
empirical examination we encounter and solve a severe multicollinearity problem. We conclude 
that the evidence supports the advertising model presented in this paper and demonstrates 
segmentation between cable and broadcast viewers in the national television advertising market. 
 
 










1.    Introduction 
Advertising plays a critical role in the funding of media in the United States, even 
of new media such as the Internet.  Despite this role, economists have devoted little 
attention to the pricing of advertising.   For example, economic models of competition 
among broadcasters and networks that rely, at least in part, on advertising revenues have 
traditionally employed fairly simple characterizations of advertisers￿ demand for 
advertising time.  Most common has been the assumption, dating back at least to Steiner 
(1952), that advertisers are willing to pay a constant amount per viewer delivered, i.e., 
that suppliers of advertising confront an infinitely elastic demand curve. The common 
justification for this assumption is that a variety of media compete vigorously to supply 
advertisers with access to potential customers, and this competition sets the competitive 
price for access to viewers that broadcasters take as a given in their competition with 
each other (Chaudhri, 1998).  This is what is called the ￿law of one price￿ in Fournier and 
Martin￿s (1983) study of television advertising. 
Alternatively, and more rarely, a downward sloping inverse demand function with 
the amount of ad time (or space for print media) may be postulated.  But this is more 
common for models of media monopolists (see, e.g., Blair and Romano, 1993.)  For the 
analysis presented in this paper, we begin by explicitly modeling the demand for ad time 
on television programs as a function of a TV commercial￿s contribution to advertiser 
profits.  We show that, for a model of competition in the sale of TV ad time based on this 
foundation, there is no market-determined price for ad time that sellers must take as 
exogenously given.  Rather, each program sees the demand for its commercial time as 
downward sloping, regardless of its competitive circumstances.  So the ￿law of one 
price￿ does not hold in this market.  Furthermore, different viewers in a program￿s 
audience may be sold at different implicit prices. 
To present our arguments and the evidence on them, we organize this paper as 
follows.  Section 2 presents our model.  Section 3 presents a test of one of the model￿s 
implications.  Section 4 concludes the paper. 
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2.    The model 
2.1 The basic model 
We consider two types of programs: programs distributed by over-the-air or 
broadcast services and programs that are distributed on a subscription basis by non-
broadcast services, e.g., cable operators and direct broadcast satellite services (DBS), like 
DirecTV and the Dish Network.  We will refer to the two types of programs as broadcast 
programs and ￿cable￿ programs.  For our purposes, the critical distinction between the 
two types of programs is that cable programs are received and viewed only by subscribers 
to cable and satellite services, while broadcast programs are received and viewed by 
cable and satellite subscribers (as retransmitted signals) and by viewers who rely solely 
on rooftop and set top antennas for receipt of the over-the-air signals broadcast by 
television stations.  
  To simplify the analysis and notation, we assume a single representative 
advertiser, which plays a role similar to the representative consumer employed in many 
monopolistic competition models.
1  The advertiser sells a single product, produces a TV 
commercial to promote it, and purchases ad time on broadcast and cable programs to air 
the commercial.  We assume: that only consumers who know about the advertiser￿s 
product will buy it; that the probability of knowing of the product￿s existence in the 
absence of advertising is less than unity; that exposure to an ad for a product makes a 
consumer aware of the product only if the consumer notices the ad within a program that 
carries it; and that the full effect of the ad on a consumer￿s purchase probability is 
realized the first time the consumer notices it.
2  In particular, we allow for the possibility 
that a viewer may watch a program but fail to notice the advertiser￿s ad during a 
commercial break. The advertiser can increase the probability viewers will notice its ad in 
a program by increasing the number of times the ad is aired during the program.   
Viewers watch television for a period (say, a week), which we will call the 
viewing period, during which they have the opportunity to watch each of the programs 
                                                 
1 Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) are prominent examples. 
2  We can relax our exposure assumption to allow a consumer￿s purchase probability to be a concave 
function of the number of ad exposures, as typically in the marketing literature, e.g., Lilien, Kotler, and 
Moorthy (1992).  However, such a relaxation complicates our analysis without changing its basic 
conclusion regarding the nature of the ad time demand function faced by program owners. 
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offered by the broadcast and cable services once.  The advertiser may purchase 
commercial time on any or all of these programs.  At the end of the viewing period is a 
shopping day during which a viewer either may or may not purchase the advertiser￿s 
product.  We assume that noticing the advertiser￿s commercial makes the same 
contribution to the purchase probability for all viewers.   
  The model makes use of the following terms: 
m ≡   the number of cable programs.  Subscripts h, i, and j will be employed to 
identify individual cable programs. 
n ≡   the number of broadcast programs.  Individual broadcast programs will be 
identified with the subscripts d, e, f,  and g.  
ak ≡    the number of units of advertising time that the advertiser purchases from 
program k, where k may be either a cable program or a broadcast program, 
and a unit of ad time is the time required to play the advertiser￿s 
commercial once. 
r(ak) ≡  the probability that a consumer watching program k will see and 
remember the ad for the advertiser￿s product on program k.  We assume 
r’> 0, r”< 0, and r(0) = 0. 
pik  ≡   the probability that a subscription viewer who watches cable program i 
will also watch program k, where k may be either a broadcast program or a 
cable program. 
pgk  ≡   the probability that a subscription viewer who watches broadcast program 
g will also watch program k. 
tgk ≡   the probability that a broadcast-only viewer who watches broadcast 
program g will also watch program k.  (Obviously, tgk=0 if k is a cable 
program.) 
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Vg  ≡   the number of broadcast-only viewers in the audience for broadcast 
program g. 
Wg  ≡   the number of subscription viewers in the audience for broadcast program 
g. 
Wi  ≡   the number of viewers in the audience for cable program i. 
Because the full contribution of an ad to a consumer￿s likelihood of purchase is 
accomplished with a single noticed exposure, the value of ads on any given program is 
the contribution they make to the likelihood that a consumer will notice the ad at least 
once during the viewing period on any of the programs on which the ad airs.  Thus, 
critical to our analysis are: Si, the probability that a viewer of cable program i will 
remember only an ad on program i; Bf , the probability that a broadcast-only viewer of 
broadcast program f will remember only an ad on program f; and Sf, the probability that a 
cable viewer in the audience for broadcast program f will remember only an ad for the 
product seen on program f.   Given the above definitions: 





noticead on anyof the n
broadcast programs
1  2  4  4  4  3  4  4  4 
• 1− pijr(aj) () j≠ i ∏
probability viewerdoesnot
notice ad onany of the other
m− 1 cable programs
1  2  4  4  4  3  4  4  4 




1  2  4  3  4  , 
Bf = (1 − tfgr(ag))r(af g ≠ f ∏ ),        
                       and  




Because it provides a simpler starting point while providing a useful comparative 
benchmark, we begin by examining the nature of competition among broadcast programs 
selling ad time in a hypothetical television market in which all programs are delivered by 
television stations over the air.  This, of course, is a description of the market for 
television ad time before cable emerged as a major supplier of television audiences to 
advertisers in the 1980s.  In modeling the competition in ad time, we take as givens the 
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probabilities for each show that its viewers will also watch each of the other shows.  This 
is not meant to imply that factors such as production and marketing budgets that may 
influence viewers￿ choices among programs are not strategic variables￿only that 
decisions on such variables precede the delivery of programs to viewers.  That is, we 
assume that competition in the sale of ad time is competition in the sale of the audiences 
actually generated.
3 
Consider first the advertiser￿s decision regarding how much ad time to purchase 
on broadcast program f, taking for the moment the amounts of time purchased on other 
programs as givens.  (We show later that the equilibrium amount of time an advertiser 
purchases on one program is not influenced by the amount of time purchased on other 
programs.)  For a representative viewer in f’s audience, the advertiser must consider two 
consequences of a small increase in the number of units of ad time purchased from f.  
First, the purchase of additional ad time on f increases the probability that the viewer will 
notice the commercial at least once during the program, which increases the likelihood 
that the advertiser￿s ad campaign in aggregate will have made this viewer aware of its 
product.  At the same time, however, the increased likelihood that the viewer will notice 
the commercial on program f reduces the contributions that the advertiser￿s ads on other 
programs make to the likelihood that the viewer will become aware of its product.  The 
net of these two effects on the likelihood that the viewer will notice the ad at least once 
on one of the television programs he or she watches, multiplied by the effect of noticing 
an ad on the likelihood of purchase times the advertiser￿s profit margin on its product, is 
the value of the marginal unit of ad time on program f to the advertiser.   
These considerations are reflected in the formal statement of the advertiser￿s first 
order condition given by equation (1), where γ f is the per unit price for ad time charged 
by program f ; w and c, respectively, are the price and marginal cost of the good sold by 
the advertiser (both taken as constants); q is the number of units of the good purchased by 
                                                 
3  Note that we also assume that differences in viewers￿ likelihoods of viewing different networks are not 
influenced by the amount of advertising time carried on the programs.  This is a standard assumption in 
media economics literature; but if television ads are considered a bad by viewers, then the probability that a 
representative viewer chooses to watch any specific program should vary inversely with the amount of ad 
time sold by the program.  See Wildman and Owen (1985), Wildman and Cameron (1989), Owen and 
Wildman (1992, chapter 4), and Wildman (1998), for analyses that consider this issue more explicitly. 
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a consumer who decides to buy; and ∆  is the contribution that noticing the ad makes to a 
consumer￿s purchase probability. 














− γ f = 0.    (1) 
  Expanding the expression in square brackets in (1), we have: 
(w − c)q∆′   r (af ) Vf
g≠ f ∏ (1− t fgr(ag))− Vg(1− tge(r(ae))r(ag)tgf










− γ f = 0. (1·) 
The first term within the square brackets is the probability that a viewer in the 
audience for program f will not notice the commercial on any other program during the 
viewing period.  Multiplied by r´(af ), it gives the marginal effect of an increase in af on 
the probability that this viewer will not notice the commercial on any other program and 
will notice it on program f.  The quantity r´(af) times the second term in the square 
brackets gives the sum of the effects of a marginal increase in af  on the probabilities that 
the ad will be noticed on each of the other programs alone.  Designate the first term in 
square brackets in (1·) by Af  and the second by Bf.  The difference Af -Bf must be positive 
if program f finds it profitable to sell ad time. 
  We assume competition among programs to be Cournot in ad time, so the owner 
of program f takes the amount of ad time sold by other programs as givens in setting af  to 





+ γ f = 0.      (2) 
  Solving (1) and (2) simultaneously, we get (3), which implicitly determinesaf
∗ , 




(w − c)q∆′   r (af
∗ ) Af − Bf []
(w− c)q∆′   ′  r (af
∗ ) Af − Bf []
=−
′  r (af
∗ )
′  ′ r  (af
∗ )
. (3) 
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  Equation 3 tells us that the profit-maximizing amount of ad time in a program is a 
function of r alone, and is not influenced by the amount of ad time sold by other 
programs.  The intuition for this result is that the advertiser values only those viewers of 
program f who will not see and notice its commercial on other programs. The parameter 
af
∗  is chosen to maximize the per viewer payment by the advertiser for access to these 
viewers and is independent of their number.  Note also that (3) means that if the ad recall 
function, r, is the same for all programs￿that is, the program doesn￿t influence the 
probability that an ad is noticed by a viewer, then the amount of ad time will be the same 
on all programs.  This seems consistent with what is observed for network prime time 
television programs.  
A fairly standard assumption in policy analyses of competition in TV advertising 
markets has been that competition forces all sellers of TV commercial time to adhere to a 
common, market-set price per viewer per ad unit in selling ad time to advertisers, once 
allowances are made for differences in the demographic characteristics of the audiences 
for different programs.  That this ￿law of one price￿ would apply to advertising markets 
was a critical assumption in Fournier and Martin￿s (1983) influential econometric study 
of the effect of concentration on the pricing of ad time in local television markets.  As 
support for this assumption, they provided evidence that a common algorithm seemed to 
explain the per viewer ad time prices observed for a small sample of television stations 
they examined.  With the model developed to this point, we can show that broadcast 
programs are not constrained by competition to charge a common per viewer price for ad 
time.  Further, while it is certainly possible that profit maximizing per-viewer prices may 
differ substantially across programs, under plausible assumptions, it should also not be 
surprising to find that they are quite similar. 
Equations (1) and (1·) describe the inverse demand function for program f ￿s 
commercial time.  Taking the total derivative of (1·) with respect to af, we get: 
dγ f
daf
= (w− c)q∆ ′ ′  r (af ) Af − Bf [] < 0. 
Dividing this expression by Vf gives the marginal effect of an increase in af on the per 
viewer price of ad time on f, which must also be negative.  So both the per unit price and 
9 Kieschnick  et al.: The Market for Television Advertising
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011 
 
the per viewer price of ad time decline in the amount of ad time sold, regardless of the 
competitive circumstances in which program f sells its time.  This makes sense because 
the program can collect only on exposures to viewers who do not see the advertiser￿s ad 
on other programs, and the marginal contribution of such exposures to the probability of 
purchase declines with the amount of ad time sold.  There is no ￿one price￿ at which a 
program must sell access to its viewers.
4   
  To more closely examine the factors that influence the relative per viewer prices 
charged by different programs, we compare the equilibrium per viewer prices for two 
programs, f and d.  For r*≡ r(a*), define zf and zd to be the equilibrium per viewer prices 
for ad time on broadcast programs f and d. 
zf =Φ (1− tfgr
*)
















   (4) 
and 


















 ,    (5) 
where Φ≡ ′  r (a
*)(w− c)q∆ .   
A close comparison of these two expressions reveals that the sale of ad time on 
program d affects the per viewer price of time sold on program f (and vice versa) only if 
tdf >0 (which implies tfd >0).  That is, if the same viewers do not show up in the audiences 
for two programs, then ad time prices for the two programs will be set independently of 
each other.  Hence, the standard assumption that exposures to demographically similar 
viewers may be treated as units of a homogeneous commodity for which there is a single 
market clearing price at which all must be sold is seen to be incorrect.  This conclusion 
necessarily follows directly from the fact that each viewer represents a separate and 
independent source of potential profit to an advertiser.  It should also be clear that, even if 
tdf >0, there is still no a priori reason zf should be equal to zd, because of the possibility 
that tfg ≠ tdg and tgf ≠ tgd.  
                                                 
4 Allowing for ads on other media does not change this conclusion. A program owner will still price its ad 
time to maximize the advertiser￿s payments for its incremental contribution to the probability that its 
message will be noticed. The only difference is that ads on other media now influence this calculation. 
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 On the other hand, if a viewer￿s presence in the audience for one program is not 
predictive of his or her likelihood of watching any other program, then tfg=tdg=teg, and so 
on, and the first term in square brackets would have the same value in equations (4) and 
(5).  In a simplified version of the extended model developed below, in which a common 
viewing probability is assumed for all broadcast programs, we show that the influence on 
per viewer price of the analogue of the second term in square brackets in (4) and (5) will 
be trivial compared to the influence of the first term as long as n is sufficiently large (an n 
of 20 is more than sufficient) and the product of r* and the viewing probability is 
substantially less than one.  As the major broadcast networks￿ programs average only 
about 10 percent of the potential audience in prime time, the viewing probability itself 
should satisfy this criterion.  Thus it is plausible that observed per viewer prices will be 
approximately the same for all broadcast programs.  Finding such a relationship should 
not be interpreted, however, as evidence that competition forces all sellers to offer access 
to their viewers at a common price￿only that when faced with similar demands for their 
ad time, they set similar prices. 
 
2.2 The extended model  
The analysis to this point has assumed likelihoods of watching different programs 
that are common to all viewers.  However, if viewers differ in their likelihoods of 
watching different programs, and if these differences are understood by advertisers, then 
we should expect that, embedded in the per unit time prices charged by programs, there 
are per viewer prices that vary among viewers according to their viewing habits.    
Because the option to receive programming signals via cable changes viewing patterns 
relative to what they would be if only broadcast programs were available, one might 
therefore expect the broadcast networks to charge advertisers different prices for access 
to the subscription and broadcast-only viewers in their audiences.  This possibility was 
suggested by Wildman (1998).  Here we explore this possibility by extending the model 
presented above to include subscription viewers.  We assume that program suppliers are 
able to set per-viewer prices for ad time that vary according to viewer characteristics, 
including whether they do or do not subscribe to cable.  We then determine the price 
program owners would charge for access to subscription viewers and compare it to the 
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broadcast-only price derived above.   That prices advertisers pay for ad time might reflect 
different weights applied to viewers with different demographic characteristics is 
generally accepted, and indeed is the justification for collection of this data by audience 
measurement services.  For this analysis we hold demographic characteristics constant 
across viewers, but allow for the possibility that per viewer prices may be influenced by 
differential access to cable programs.  
Imagine for the moment that the owner of broadcast program g can sell different 
amounts of ad time for access to the subscription and broadcast-only portions of his or 
her audience. Let λ g be the price per unit of ad time charged for access to g￿s cable 
audience, and let  ￿  a  g be the amount of ad time purchased by the advertiser. Then equation 
(6) would be our advertiser￿s first order condition for purchasing ad time for g￿s cable 
audience. 
 
      Φ Wg
∂ Sg
∂ ￿  a  g
+ W f
∂ Sf
∂ ￿  a  g
+
∂ Sj
∂ ￿  a  g j ∑









− λ g = 0 (6) 
 












      ( 7 )  
 
  Solving (6) and (7) simultaneously for the profit maximizing value of ￿  a  g, not 
surprisingly we get 
￿  a  g
* =−
′  r (ag
*)




So a* maximizes the revenue from ad time sales to both cable viewers and broadcast-
only viewers.  This means that a broadcast program with both cable and broadcast-only 
viewers in its audience is able to maximize the ad revenues associated with each of the 
subsets of its audience by selling a* units of ad time.   
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 Using  a* in equation (6) and dividing by Wg gives ς g, the equilibrium per-viewer 
price for ad time paid by the advertiser for access to the cable viewers in g￿s audience.  
 
ξ g =Φ (1 − pgfr
*)




Wg j ∑ (1− pjir
*)( 1 − pjfr
*)r
*p jg





















.     (8) 
 
  We simplify equation (8) by assuming that for a representative subscriber there is 
a common probability α  of watching any given broadcast program, and a common 
probability ￿ of watching any given cable program.  In this case, Wj /Wg = ￿/α , all j and g, 
and Wf /Wg=1, for all f and g.  Given these assumptions,  
                 
ζ h =Φ (1− α r
∗ )
n− 1(1− β r
∗ )





m− 1((1− α r
∗ )α r
∗ )





n − 2]       (9) 
 
  For the representative viewer, total viewing time during the viewing period will 
beα n + β m.  In the United States, the dramatic growth in the number of per-household 
viewing hours devoted to cable programming has occurred largely at the expense of time 
spent watching broadcast programs, rather than through an increase in total viewing 
hours.    If we assume that audience gains for cable programs are reflected in a 
numerically equivalent reduction in the aggregate audience for broadcast programs, then, 












If a cable viewer who watches only broadcast programs has the same viewing 
likelihoods for broadcast programs as a broadcast-only viewer, zh and ς g must have the 
same value.   Taking this situation as a benchmark, we used equation (9) to examine the 
effect of increasing the likelihoods that cable viewers will watch cable programs on the 
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relative values of zh and ς g by examining the effect of increasing ￿ on ς g for different 
values of the parameters n, m, r* and α   for Φ  set at the arbitrary value of $10. 
  Tables 1 and 2 present results for two of these exercises.  The last four lines in 
each table present, respectively, the values of the three terms inside the square brackets in 
(9) multiplied by $10, and the price per cable viewer, which is $10 times the first term 
minus the second and the third terms.  Dashes indicate values so small that the program 
used for the calculations rounded them to zero.  In both tables, the price per subscription 
viewer rises above the price charged for a broadcast-only viewer as cable programs￿ 
audiences grow from very low initial levels and stays above the broadcast-only price 
even as cable program viewing probabilities approach those for broadcast programs.   
The same basic pattern was revealed in most, though not all, of our numerical 
applications of equation (9).   In particular, the cable price per viewer may fall 
continuously from the broadcast-only level for very small values of n and/or r*. 
  If we assume six half-hour programs during prime time for a viewing period of 
five week days, then Table 1 would reflect the prime-time options available to the 
subscribers of a cable system or satellite service carrying five broadcast networks and 15 
ad-supported cable networks.  The viewer depicted would watch an average of 15 
programs per week, or an hour and a half of prime time programs during a typical 
evening.  Table 2 might reflect ad pricing for viewers who watch one hour of prime time 
programs per night and select from a much smaller set of 20 broadcast and 50 cable 
programs￿either because their pay service offers them fewer options or because they 
have restricted the set of programs from which they choose to some subset of the 
programs available by excluding, perhaps based on prior experience or word of mouth, 
programs they believe are unlikely to provide them with a satisfactory viewing 
experience. 
  We can say a bit more about the generality of the pricing pattern reflected in 
Tables 1 and 2 by noting that the first term in square brackets in (9) almost solely drives 
the relationship between cable viewing shares and per viewer prices due to the effects of 
(α  r*)
n-1 and (α  r*)
n-2 in the second and third terms.  The derivative of the first term with 
respect to β   is 
 




∗ (α − β )− 1+ r
∗ β [] , 
 
where, Ψ= mr
∗ (1− α r
∗ )
n− 2(1− β r
∗ )
m− 1.   
This expression may be positive or negative, but there must be some threshold 
value of β ,  ￿  β  < α ( ￿  β  ), beyond which this expression is always negative, so that 
increasing cable program viewing likelihoods beyond this point causes the per-viewer 
price for cable viewers to fall.  For β =0, this expression is positive as long as nα  > 1/ r*, 
and the likelihood that growth in audiences for cable programs will increase the per 
viewer price charged advertisers for access to subscribers relative to the price for non-
subscribers in broadcast program audiences increases in n,α   and r*.  The quantity nα   is 
the number of programs watched by a representative viewer during a typical viewing 
period.  Thus, for r*=1 and a program length of half an hour, the price per cable viewer in 
a broadcast program￿s audience would rise above the price per broadcast-only viewer as 
audiences for cable programs began to grow from zero as long as the typical cable viewer 
spent more than an hour per week watching prime time programs.  For r*=0.05, the cable 
per viewer ad price would rise as cable program audiences grew from zero if the typical 
cable viewer watched more than 10 hours of prime time television each week, and it 
would fall otherwise.    
  
3.  Test of the model 
  A key implication of our model is that the television advertising market is likely 
segmented according to the mode by which consumers view television programs.  
Consequently the prices that advertisers pay for television advertising will depend upon 
the mix of viewers according to their mode of viewing (i.e., broadcast-only versus 
￿cable￿).  This implication is in sharp contract to the ￿law of one price￿ implication of 
assuming that advertisers are willing to pay a constant amount per viewer delivered, 
regardless of the mode by which they are delivered.  Thus we can test our model by 
discerning whether advertisers pay different implicit prices of delivered viewers 
according to their mode of viewing. 
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3.1 The Data 
Beginning with their November, 1996 National Audience Demographics report, 
Nielsen Media Research began breaking out broadcast-only television households. Using 
these data, we focus on network television programs broadcast during the period 28 
October-24 November 1996. We focus on broadcast network television programs, rather 
than local programs, for several reasons. The main reason is that these programs reach 
enough broadcast-only television households that one might expect to discern a 
broadcast-only price effect.     
Of all the broadcast network television programs monitored by Nielsen, we focus 
upon regularly-scheduled prime time network television shows of the largest networks 
(ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC). This means that we exclude specials such as "When 
Animals Attack’’, and programs such as "Monday Night Football" and "Tuesday Night 
Movie" for which there might be a significant amount of advertiser uncertainty about 
what audiences are to be delivered by the programming. We exclude non-prime time 
network programs because of the variability of clearance of network programs outside of 
prime time.  
For the period 28 October-24 November 1996, there are 108 such shows. 
From Nielsen (1996a), for each show, we obtain the total number of viewers (in 
thousands) aged 18-49 (TOT) and the number of viewers (in thousands) aged 18-49 
whose reception is broadcast-only (BO).  Subtracting the latter from the former gives the 
number of non-broadcast or ￿cable￿ viewers (C).  From Nielsen (1996b), we obtained the 
cost (in thousands of dollars) per thirty second commercial (COST) for each show. This 
figure represents Nielsen’s estimate, based upon data supplied by the networks, of the 
average price paid for a thirty second commercial during the network program.
5 
 
  3.2 The statistical model 
We assume that advertisers buying network advertising time are buying access to 
the audiences delivered by network programming.  Thus the demand for a 30 second 
commercial aired during a network program depends upon the audience delivered.  On 
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the supply side, we assume broadcast networks determine the audiences they will supply 
and compete on price. This is consistent with several points. First, networks determine 
their program offerings in advance of the sale of advertising time.  Further, the 
advertising time supplied by networks is fixed and perishable. Finally, there is little 
variation in the amount of advertising time offered by networks during an hour of 
network programming, across quarters and networks.
6   
The above points imply that our data on a cross-section of broadcast network 
programs allows us to estimate the implicit prices of different delivered audiences.  Let 
the total audience delivered be decomposed into n mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
groups,  1,, n XX K . Thus, following Moulton (1991), we express the cost of a 30 second 
commercial aired during a broadcast network program as: 
  
  11 nn COST p X p X =+ + L  (10) 
 
where  i p  represents the implicit price of a viewer in group i.
7  Given that we can 
reasonably assume that the i X  are exogenous for each program in our sample, we can 
estimate the i p .  For our purposes, we divide the total observed audience of a network 
program (TOT) into two components according to whether the viewing household 
receives broadcast signals only (BO) or not (C).  If the law of one price is applies to 
network audiences, then the implicit prices of these components should be the same (i.e., 
advertisers should not value viewers differently simply because of the medium by which 
viewers obtain network programming).
8 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Using Nielsen’s estimate of the average price means that we can ignore the influence of features specific 
to particular network advertising contracts and focus on the features common to all such contracts for 
network programs, i.e. the characteristics of the audiences delivered.
6 See table on page 19 of Broadcasting & Cable, (March 21, 1997) for data on the amount of network 
advertising time across time and networks. 
7 We test and validate the reasonableness of this linear specification in the next section.
8  Unless one argues that the kind of people who watch a broadcast network program on cable are radically 
different from the kind of people who watch the same broadcast network program over-the-air, then our 
design effectively controls for differences in audience demographic composition.  
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3.3 The relationship between the cost of a network ad and its audience size 
 
We begin with an examination of the relationship between the cost of 
a 30 second ad during a network program and the total audience size delivered by the 
associated program.  We do so for two reasons.  First, it allows us to estimate the value 
advertisers put on an additional broadcast network program viewer irrespective of their 
other characteristics.  Second, it allows us to examine possible nonlinearities in this 
relationship. 
Figure 1 indicates that some of the observations clearly are influential, and may in 
fact be outliers.  Subsequent examination of univariate plots of COST and TOT indicates 
that the four rightmost observations might be outliers. A block test for discordancy in a 
linear model based on recursive residuals (Hawkins, 1980, §7.2) rejects the null 
hypothesis of no outliers.  To see the implications of removing these four observations, 
we display the lines of best fit for all 102 observations, and for the first 98 observations. 
In what follows we use the first 98 observations.
9 
  Figure 1 also suggests that the relationship between COST and TOT might 
be linear.  To test this hypothesis, we regress a third-order polynomial in total audience 
delivered on the cost of the associated network advertising time.  This can be viewed as a 
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where t-statistics are reported within parentheses. These results strongly suggest that 
COST is linear in TOT as the second and third order terms are insignificant. An F-test of 
this hypothesis confirms this inference: F(2,94)=0.408 with marginal significance level 
(m.s.l)=0.666.  Additionally, fitting local quadratic functions by the method of loess 
(Cleveland, 1993) also indicates linearity.  Thus, these data strongly suggest that COST is 
linear in TOT. 
Given this evidence, we estimate the relationship between COST and TOT as: 
                                                 
9 Our qualitative results are the same for both 98 and 102 observations. 

















with t-statistics in parentheses. Using the Eicker-White procedure for testing for 
heteroscedasticity, we regress the squared residuals from (12) on a third-order 
polynominal in TOT.  The heteroscedasticity test statistic is 5.2 with m.s.l. 0.16; thus 
homoscedasticity is not rejected. The Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality is 1.580 
with m.s.l. 0.454, so the null hypothesis of normality is not rejected. Thus we conclude 
that COST is linear in TOT and that advertisers paid just over two cents per viewer during 
our sample period. 
 
3.4 Parametric Estimates of the Relationship 
Turning to an examination of the evidence on whether the national television 
advertising market is segmented, we note that equation (10) above suggests that COST 
should be linear in BO and C where BO represents the number of broadcast-only viewers 
and C the number of ￿cable￿viewers.  Our evidence that COST is linear in TOT is 
consistent with this presumption, since TOT=BO+C.  An examination 
of Figure 2 further supports this inference as COST appears linear in BO, given C, and 
COST appears to be linearly related to BO and C.
10 
To test this hypothesis, we regress COST on BO, BO
2, C, BO￿C and C
2, and 
compare its results to a regression of COST on BO and C.  The resulting Wald test 
statistic equals1.958 and thus fails to reject the joint hypothesis that 2 BO β ,  BO C β × and 
2 C β equal zero.  Trivariate coplots (Cleveland, 1993) also indicate that COST is linear in 
both BO conditional on C and C conditional on BO.  Consequently, we reject the 
hypothesis that COST is nonlinear in BO and C.  
If the ￿law of one price￿ holds, then the price of an additional broadcast-only 
                                                 
10 We omit lines of best fit in Figure 2 because it is inappropriate to impute all of COST to either BO or C.
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viewer should be equal to the price of an additional cable viewer. To test this proposition, 
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with t-statistics reported in parentheses. These results are inconsistent with the law of one 
price: the point estimates imply two and one-half cents per cable viewer, and one-half of 
one cent per broadcast viewer.  However, the insignificance of  BO β  implies that 
advertisers are not paying for broadcast-only viewers. Since the proportion of broadcast-
only viewers ranges from 0.15 to 0.40, we find this difficult to accept. The high R
2 and 
insignificant t-statistics suggest collinearity as a reason for this aberrant result. The 
standard diagnostics (Judge, et al, 1988, §21.3.1) indicate the presence of 
multicollinearity. The simple correlation between BO and C is 0.85, which is high, and is 
greater than the R
2 from Eq. 13. Rescaling the independent variables to have unit length, 
but not recentering, yields a largest-to-smallest eigenvalue ratio whose square root is 
11,938.  These results suggest that further analysis of multicollinearity is warranted. 
 
  3.5 Diagnosing Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity does not mean that all coefficients will be estimated with great 
imprecision.  In fact, it is possible to determine which coefficients will be estimated 
precisely and which coefficients will be estimated imprecisely due to the 
multicollinearity.  However, further analysis is necessary to accomplish this. 
The possible effect of this multicollinearity can be assessed in the usual fashion 
using Silvey’s (1969) method (see also Judge, et al, 1985, §22.3) and Belsley’s (1991) 
guide to implementing the method. For this analysis the variables are rescaled to have 
unit length but are not recentered (Belsley, 1991, §3.3). 
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2 σ is the error  variance and  jk p  is the k-th element of the normalized eigenvector 
associated with the j-th eigenvalue,  j λ .  The proportion of var( ) k b associated with any 


















and the condition indices of X are given by  max jj η λλ = so that  j λ necessarily assumes its 
minimum of 1.0 for some j. 
Table 3 gives the variance-decomposition proportions, where the leftmost column 
gives the condition index and each of the three rightmost columns sums to unity. The 
condition indices are extremely large, since a condition index in excess of 30 is 
considered evidence of multicollinearity.  Examining the condition indices, we see 
immediately that the third eigenvalue is troublesome, and the second eigenvalue might 
be. The presence of two or more large  kj φ  in a row indicates that multicollinearity 
associated with that row’s characteristic root adversely affects the precision of the 
estimated coefficients.  Here,  kj φ > 0.50 is taken to be large (Belsley, et al, 1980).  Hence, 
we conclude that the third eigenvalue alone is the source of the multicollinearity. 
The multicollinearity induced by the third eigenvalue does not necessarily affect 
all the coefficients, since from Eq. 14 we see that the k-th coefficient is unaffected by the 
j-the root as long as  kj p  is small. Table 4 gives the matrix of normalized eigenvectors. 
Examining the third row, we see that  3,3 p  is small, so we can expect a good estimate of 
C β .  From the second row,  2,3 p  is not small, so we can expect that the estimate of 
BO β will be substantially affected by the multicollinearity, and will be "nearly 
inestimable’’.  Vinod and Ullah (1981, §5.3.2) explain how near inestimability arising 
from multicollinearity can lead to "wrong’’ signs or insignificance, casting further doubt 
on the validity of (13).  Based on a priori knowledge of the broadcast industry and 
the eigenvalue analysis, we believe that accurate parameter estimates will show that  C β is 
"close’’ to two and one half cents and that  BO β  is not "close’’ to one half of one cent. 
 
21 Kieschnick  et al.: The Market for Television Advertising
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011 
 
3.6 'Solving' the multicollinearity problem 
Any particular multicollinearity problem can be characterized either as a sample 
problem or a population problem.  In the former case, the best solution is to increase the 
sample size.  In the present case, television programs with a larger broadcast-only 
audience tend also to have a larger cable audience, so the problem can be characterized as 
a population problem.  The textbook remedies (drop a variable, principal component 
regression, etc.) are all unsatisfactory.  To estimate the change in cost attributable to a 
marginal change in the number of broadcast-only viewers,  BO β , ideally we should like to 
regress that part of cost not attributable to non-broadcast viewers, (C -  C β C), on the 
number of broadcast only viewers, BO;  i.e., regress (C -  C β C) on BO.  Unfortunately, 
this method for estimating  BO β  assumes that we already know  C β .  Similarly, if we 
already knew  BO β , then we could regress (C - BO β BO) on C to estimate the change in 
cost due to a marginal increase in the number of cable viewers,  C β .  Obviously, we 
cannot directly pursue either of these strategies because we do not have a priori 
knowledge of either  C β  or  BO β .  However, we can pursue equivalent strategies that will 
lead to good estimates of  C β  and  BO β  that are not contaminated by multicollinearity. 
To obtain accurate estimates of  BO β  and  C β , we shall reduce the dimension of 
the parameter space (Judge, et al, 1984, §22.4.2), and then reparametrize the model 
(Spanos, 1986, §20.5 gives the theory; Hendry, 1996, p. 276 gives an example).  
Moreover, the transformed model provides for direct estimation of the parameters of 
interest, so there is no need to "reinterpret’’ our estimates in term of the original 
parameters. 
For each program the marginal cost of an "average’’ viewer must be the weighted 
sum of the costs of broadcast and cable viewers.  We take this to be the linear weighted 
sum: 
  TB O B O C C βγ β γ β ε =+ +  (16) 
 
where  BO γ is the proportion of the audience which is broadcast-only and  C γ is the 
proportion of the audience which is cable.  Since this holds true for individual 
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observations, it must hold true for the means, which we shall denote with an overbar.  
Define the two series  () BO BOB OC γ =+ and  () C CB OC γ =+ which have means  BO γ = 
0.2991 and  NB γ =0.7009, respectively, and a common standard error of the sample mean, 
0.0046. 
Solving (16) for BO β , using  BO γ ,  C γ and  ￿
T β for  BO γ ,  C γ , and  T β , substituting  





















which has one less dimension than the multicollinear regression (13).  Note that this 
estimate of  C β =0.0230 is "close’’ to two and one-half cents. 
Repeating the procedure, this time focusing on  BO β  yields  ￿
BO β = 0.0145 with a t-
stat of 2.604.  Note that this estimate of  C β = 0.0145 is not "close’’ to one-half of one 
cent, but is instead almost one and one-half cents.  The reparameterization (17) might 
appear ungainly, though it has a simple intuition. Some algebra (see the Appendix) shows 
that the regression (17) is equivalent to: 
  3 BO C COST BO c C ββ ε −= + +  (18) 
The left hand side of this equation is simply COST less that portion attributable to 
broadcast viewers.
11  Thus the reparameterization (17) is equivalent to a regression on the 
portion of COST attributable to cable viewers on the number of cable viewers.  A similar 
interpretation holds for the reparameterization effected by focusing on BO β . 
Of interest is whether the fit based on the reparameterized results is significantly 
different than the initial least squares result.  Regressing COST on the artificial variable 
W= 0.0145 BO + 0.0230 C yields: 
                                                 
11 Because there is a constant term on the right hand side and only the slope is of interest, it is immaterial 
whether we specify the COST attributable to broadcast viewers at α +β BOBO or just β BOBO.
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2 compares favorably with the results of  Equation 4.  A test for loss of fit 
(Greene, 1997, §7.4), treating (19) as the restricted regression, yields F(1,95)=0.87 with 
m.s.l. = 0.352.  Thus the fits of Equations 13 and 19 are in substantial agreement. 
We see, then, that an advertiser will pay about 2.3 cents for an additional cable 
viewer, and just under 1.5 cents for an additional broadcast viewer, 
i.e., an additional cable viewer is 59% ( = 100(0.0230/0.0145 - 1)%) more valuable to the 
network than an additional broadcast viewer.  The difference in prices paid is consistent 
with our model of the market for television advertising, and strongly rejects the ￿law of 
one price￿ for television advertising. 
 
4.  Summary and Conclusions 
While advertising plays a critical role in the funding of media, including Internet, 
in the United States, economists have devoted little attention to the pricing of advertising.  
This paper presents a model of a competitive market for television advertising time for 
which it is shown that per viewer prices may vary among programs, and, for broadcast 
programs, that different implicit per-viewer prices may be charged for those members of 
their audiences that do and do not subscribe to cable or satellite services.  These 
predictions stand in stark contrast to the nearly standard assumption, going back to 
Steiner (1952) that a common per viewer price must apply to all ad units sold in these 
same markets.   
Our econometric study of broadcast network advertising prices for 108 prime time 
programs suggests that networks are effectively charging substantially different per 
viewer prices for the cable viewers (non-broadcast only viewers) in their audiences than 
for their broadcast-only viewers.  This evidence supports the model proposed in this 
paper and rejects the standard assumption that prices in advertising markets are subject to 
the ￿law of one price￿ regardless of mode of delivery.  Interestingly, our results are 
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consistent with Liebowitz￿s (1982) evidence that cable segmented the television 
advertising market in Canada. 
As a parting comment, we note that technologies marrying the Internet and 
television are making it possible for advertisers to better track the viewers of programs 
they advertise on.  The recent controversy over Tivo￿s use of its Internet connection to 
upload data on its subscribers￿ viewing habits is one example of what is now possible and 
will become more prevalent in the future.  This feature of an Internet TV service can be 
incorporated in the model developed above by eliminating the likelihoods associated with 
viewers￿ choices.  Instead the expressions for the value of advertising time will have only 
the r component of the expressions for the probability of the advertiser￿s commercial 
being noticed on a particular program, and only programs actually watched (rather than 
the larger set of potentially watched programs) will be retained in these expressions.  
With interactive commercials, advertisers would also have firmer knowledge of whether 
their commercials were noticed as well, which would modify r.  Consequently we expect 
the considerations put forth in this paper to be applicable to future video advertising as 
technology changes the delivery of video programming. 
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Effect of Growth in Cable Viewing on Per Viewer Price for Cable Subscribers:  
for n=150, m=450, r*=0.25 and α  =0.1 
 
β  0 0.005  0.01  0.02  0.022  0.024 
α  0.1 .085  0.07  0.04  0.034  0.028 
1
st  term 23.00¢ 23.21¢ 23.35¢ 23.44¢ 23.43¢ 23.41¢ 
2
nd term  0  *  *  *  ￿  ￿ 
3
rd term  *  *  *  *  *  ￿ 
Price per 
viewer 
23.00¢ 23.21¢ 23.35¢ 23.44¢ 23.43¢ 23.41¢ 
   * Calculated values of less than 10
-250¢. 
 






Effect of Growth in Cable Viewing on Per Viewer Price for Cable Subscribers:  
for n=20, m=50, r*=0.25 and α  =0.5 
 
β  0  0.05  0.08  0.10 0.12 0.14 
α  0.5  0.375  0.3  0.25 0.20 0.15 
1
st  term  14.41¢  16.61¢  17.33¢  17.55¢ 17.53¢ 17.30¢ 
2
nd  term  0  **  **  ** ** ** 
3
rd  term  **  **  **  ** ** ** 
Price per 
viewer 
14.41¢  16.61¢  17.33¢  17.55¢ 17.53¢ 17.30¢ 
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j η    
1 ￿ var( ) c   ￿ var( ) BO β   ￿ var( ) C β  
   k=1  k=2  k=3 
1.00000 j=1  4.2E-15  1.5E-15  0.00650 
18,978,879 j=2 0.4622  0.0202  0.3278 










Matrix of eigenvectors, pkj 
 
 
 j=1  j=2  j=3 
k=1  0.0004 -0.9305 0.3663 
k=2 0.0004  -0.3663  -0.9305 
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Scatter of COST on BO(x) and C(+) 
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Ideally, letting C=COST, we would like to estimate 
 
  3 BO C CB O cC ββ ε −= + +  































Look now at the second term on the RHS. Solving (17) for  C β and inserting, 
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 to each side yields: 3 CB O Cc C B O ββ ε =+ + + .
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